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eralize, to find causes and substances, are vain abstractions. This position seems to M. Halleux not wholly false, but rather an exaggeration of the truth. It is true that all knowledge comes from sense, but yet by reflection upon this we do reach general principles which are valid. It must be admitted that sensuous knowledge is by nature imperfect and external, failing to reach the 'inner nature' of things, but still there is a reality to be known, and in some measure our thought gets at the nature of that reality.

The reasoning by which these conclusions are reached is neither very original nor very convincing, but there is in it a smack of individuality which often gives it interest. The main line of argument is somewhat as follows : sensuous knowledge is external and phenomenal, because in any object of knowledge, *e. g.*, a man, all the sensuous qualities are continually passing away, while the man himself remains ; there must then be an inner nature, an essence, not revealed to sense, which is the nature of the thing in itself, and remains ever the same. But secondly, an examination of general thinking reveals the fact that it is just such an essence as this which it seeks to know ; our concept 'man' is that of the type, the genus, which is ever identical with itself, even though it constantly appears in the multitudinous accidents of sense. It follows therefore that general thinking, in part at least, escapes phenomenality and strives after the essential nature of things as they are. Here is a very satisfactory conclusion, but the way to it does not seem wholly clear or unobstructed. One would ask, first, for more light upon the statement that the 'type' or 'essential nature' which remains the same throughout a man's life is the true nature of the man in any other sense than is any passing modification of his being. And secondly, if the sensuous qualities do not reveal the true nature, it is not at all evident how the concept, which is avowedly only an abstraction from these, can do so.

ALEX. MEIKLEJOHN.

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The Gospel According to Darwin. By WOODS HUTCHINSON, A.M., M.D. Chicago, The Open Court Publishing Co., 1898.—pp. 241.

As might be inferred from the title, *The Gospel According to Darwin* is a comparison of modern theology, especially that of the Calvinistic type, with the conclusions deduced by the author from the theory of Darwinism. In place of the modified Manichæism of Dante and Milton, it proposes to instal the doctrine of the actual effective omnipresence and omnipotence of the good. In opposition to the dogma of total depravity, it calls attention to the fact that vice is for the most part but virtue misapplied. Current views of death it would rob of their horror, by showing that they are based on misunderstanding or exaggeration. Finally, in contrast with the hope of "an indefinite prolongation of our petty personal existence," we are pointed to the glory of membership in the Choir Invisible. The exposition of these familiar doctrines cannot be pronounced either critical or coherent

at every point. When we are told by way of a theodicy that "the essential benefit of pain lies in the avoiding of its cause," we are reminded of Diedrich Knickerbocker's account of the benefit conferred upon the Indians by the Dutch in introducing medicines among them, and then, that these blessings might be enjoyed to the full, introducing the diseases which the medicines were calculated to cure. The glorification of the courage and perseverance of the ant and the bee may be forgiven Isaac Watts, but not a contemporary of Lloyd Morgan. The point of view of those who, with Professor Royce, deny the possibility of a philosophy of evolution, in any legitimate sense of that term, has never dawned upon the author. Nevertheless, he has produced a manly and in many ways an imposing book, one well adapted to the needs of the young student of biology, who, despising, as every good biologist should, the subtleties of the metaphysician, is none the less building up for himself a philosophy of atheism and despair.

FRANK CHAPMAN SHARP.

Zusammenhang zwischen Ethik und Ästhetik. Von DR. M. J. BERDYCZEWSKI. Berner Studien zur Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte, Band IX. Bern, Steiger & Cie., 1897.—pp. 57.

The standpoint of this essay is absolute phenomenism. Its aim is to identify ethics with æsthetics. It begins with the dictum: "Man is the measure of all things." This must apply to the practical as well as to the theoretical. There is no universally valid truth and no universally valid law of conduct. Kant is fundamentally inconsistent in attempting to give an insight into the noumenal world by means of the moral will in his second *Critique*, after demonstrating the unknowableness of the noumenal in the first *Critique*. He cut the Gordian knot with a sword. The place of logic is usurped, albeit quite effectively, by his glowing enthusiasm. But the author maintains: "I cannot belong to two worlds at the same time. There is only one world, and that is my world, in which I live and work with all my powers of soul—the world of phenomena."

The second chapter reviews cursorily the historical theories of the relation of the moral and the beautiful, giving special attention to Bruno, Shaftesbury, Schiller, and Herbart. In the third and fourth chapters, which contain the main argument of the essay, the subject is viewed respectively from the standpoints of contemplation and creation. In both cases the moral and the æsthetic are found to be one, or more exactly the moral is identified with the æsthetic. The marks of freedom from interest and independence of existence, by which Kant characterizes the objects of the æsthetic judgment, are shown to belong in the same sense and in the same degree to the objects of our moral judgment. Both judgments are of the nature of a clear, immediate, intuitive presentation, a sudden admiration which cannot find its source in reason, but only in feeling. Both produce a transcendent effect. "The æsthetic and ethical contemplation is something super-personal, super-human. On this height man comes to know himself; he forgets his